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Abstract 
We examine whether free trade is superior to tariff policy if the government of an importing 
country cannot precommit to an ex ante optimal tariff rate in the presence of a time lag 
between production and trade decisions. Based on a simple partial equilibrium model with an 
export monopoly, we show that the preferable choice between free trade and a time-consistent 
tariff policy depends on the market size of the importing country. More specifically, if the 
market size is larger than a certain level, the importing country prefers free trade to the 
time-consistent tariff policy. However, because a free trade policy is not credible in the 
presence of a time lag, the government of the importing country requires international 
organizations and rules such as GATT/WTO as commitment devices. Thus, using a game 
theoretic approach, we analyze under what conditions becoming a member of the 
international organizations is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and show that a free trade 
policy under the GATT/WTO regime is Pareto improving for the importing and exporting 
countries. 
 
JEL Classification Number: F1  
Keywords: free trade, time-consistent tariff, time lag, market size, GATT/WTO 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗  The earlier version of this paper is based on Toshimitsu (1997). 
☆ Corresponding author: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, 1-155, Nishinomiya, 
662-8501, Japan Tel.: +81 798 54 6440, Fax: +81 798 51 0944, email: ttsutomu@kwansei.ac.jp 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
It is generally agreed upon that a large country should choose a tariff policy rather than a 
free trade policy, i.e., laissez-faire. However, this statement has to be examined in the 
presence of a time lag between production and trade (or consumption) decisions. We should 
reconsider this statement, however, if domestic and foreign firms decide prices and outputs in 
the short run as well as capacities and cost functions in the long run. This is because there is a 
time-inconsistency issue associated with an optimal policy. In other words, a government with 
some degree of discretion or without any credible commitments has an incentive to renege on 
an ex ante announced optimal policy. Furthermore, the same problem will occur with regard 
to a free trade policy. Thus, we have to investigate the credibility and superiority of free trade. 
Since the publication of the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1977), which 
addressed the time-inconsistency problem of optimal policy, there have been many theoretical 
and empirical papers in the field of trade policy. Based on the idea that an ex ante optimal 
trade policy is time inconsistent, Staiger and Tabellini (1987) find that a government with a 
sufficient degree of discretion may have an incentive to provide protection, because the 
redistribution effect of trade policy is larger if the policy is unanticipated. Furthermore, they 
show that a suboptimal but time-consistent trade policy involves excessive protection. 
Similarly, Lapan (1988) illustrates that the inability to commit to an ex ante optimal tariff 
reduces the welfare of both importing and exporting countries. In other words, in the presence 
of a time lag between production and consumption decisions, the welfare of these countries 
under an ex post tariff policy is lower than that under an ex ante optimal tariff policy. 
Staiger and Tabellini (1989) analyze that the presence of a time lag between production 
and consumption causes an optimal trade policy to be time inconsistent. In their conclusion, 
however, they point out that international organizations such as GATT facilitate international 
cooperation among individual countries. In particular, Staiger (1995) states that “with a 
sufficient degree of discretion, an ex ante optimal policy is bound to lack credibility, because 
it is almost surely time inconsistent. When domestic institutions are too weak to provide the 
desired commitment, international trade agreements could serve as a possible device in 
interactions between a government and the private sector, and restore the credibility of the 
optimal trade policy.” (p. 1516) 
Furthermore, following these views, Staiger and Tabellini (1991, 1999) undertake an 
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empirical analysis in which GATT rules serve as a potential commitment device. Their 
empirical results provide some support for the view that GATT rules help member 
governments make trade policy commitments to their private sectors or domestic residents. As 
will be shown below, we examine under what conditions an importing country decides to 
become a member of GATT/WTO to precommit to a free trade policy. 
The models mentioned above are based on perfect competition. Thus, the point of these 
studies is that the ex post foreign export elasticity of supply is less than the ex ante elasticity. 
Thus, the ex post optimal tariff rate is larger than the ex ante optimal tariff rate. In this paper, 
however, we clarify the strategic relations between the government of the importing country 
(home, hereafter) and a private sector, i.e., a monopolistic firm, in the exporting (foreign, 
hereafter) country, based on a game theoretic framework. 
There are two papers, Horiba and Tsutsui (2000) and Ishizawa (1995), closely related to 
our model. Following the framework of Choi (1995) and assuming an international duopoly 
and the capacity decisions, Horiba and Tsutsui (2000) compare a discriminatory tariff regime 
and a uniform tariff regime. They show that the importing country’s welfare is higher in the 
uniform tariff regime, and that free trade dominates tariff policy in terms of welfare ranking. 
Using a specific cost function, they examine the effect of adjustment costs on welfare and 
plant size. That is, if the adjustment costs are sufficiently large, the welfare in the case of free 
trade is larger than that for tariff policy. However, in this paper, we focus on the market size of 
an importing country. In addition, we illustrate explicitly the strategic relationships between 
the home government and the foreign firm. 
Furthermore, based on a simple general equilibrium model, Ishizawa (1995) examines a 
time-consistent commercial policy in the presence of a foreign monopolist. He shows that an 
importing country attains a lower level of welfare with a time-consistent tariff policy than 
would be attained under an ex ante optimal tariff policy. 
Exploiting the ideas of Lapan (1988), Horiba and Tsutsui (2000), and Ishizawa (1995), we 
present a very simple model composed of two (i.e., an importing and an exporting) countries, 
in other words, two players: the home government and the foreign firm. We also assume that 
the foreign firm is an export monopolist, and that there are no related domestic firms in the 
importing country. The foreign firm decides the production level and then the distribution of 
supply to the home and foreign markets. In other words, the foreign firm allocates the product 
to the home and foreign markets, respectively, given the production level. In this stage, the 
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home government can enforce a tariff policy. We consider the precommitment and 
non-precommitment cases, respectively. In the case of precommitment, given the ex ante 
announced optimal tariff rate, the foreign firm decides the production level. Subsequently, the 
home government charges the tariff rate on the product supplied by the foreign firm. However, 
because the ex ante announced tariff policy is not credible without any commitments, the 
home government has an incentive to renege on the tariff rate after the production decision of 
the foreign firm. That is, a time-inconsistency problem occurs. Accordingly, if the home 
government does not have any commitment devices to make the foreign firm believe the tariff 
policy, it is forced to choose a time-consistent (ex post optimal) tariff policy, which is 
suboptimal and discretionary. 
Our main results are as follows.  
(i) The welfare of both the importing and exporting countries under the 
time-consistent (ex post optimal) tariff policy is always lower than that under the 
ex ante optimal tariff policy.  
(ii) The preferable choice between free trade and the time-consistent tariff policy 
depends on the market size of the importing country. More specifically, if the 
market size of the importing country is larger than a certain level, the importing 
country prefers free trade to the time-consistent tariff policy.  
(iii) In this case, because free trade is not credible in the presence of a time lag between 
production and trade decisions, international institutions and organizations’ rules, 
such as GATT/WTO, are required for the government of the importing country to 
make a free trade policy commitment to the foreign firm. That is, whether or not 
joining GATT/WTO is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, SPNE hereafter, 
depends on the ‘subjective probability’ as believed by the foreign firm (defined as 
the degree to which the foreign firm expects that the importing government will 
make the first move or will renege on the announced tariff rate after the foreign 
firm decides the production level) and on the market size of the importing country. 
(iv) If the market size of the importing country is sufficiently large and/or the 
subjective probability as believed by the foreign firm is sufficiently small, a free 
trade policy for the importing country is credible, because it joins GATT/WTO as 
a commitment device. As a result, the benefits of free trade accrue to the importing 
and exporting countries. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, which is 
composed of a three-stage game. Section 3 considers the ex ante optimal tariff policy and free 
trade in the case of precommitment, and then the time-consistent tariff policy in the case of 
non-precommitment. Furthermore, we compare welfare in the cases of both the importing and 
exporting countries, and then show that free trade is superior to the tariff policy if the market 
size of the importing country is larger than a certain level. Section 4 discusses the credibility 
of a free trade policy. In particular, a free trade policy is Pareto superior for both the importing 
and exporting countries if the importing country’s market size is larger than a certain size. In 
this case, we discuss the roles of international organizations such as GATT/WTO as 
commitment devices to accomplish a free trade regime. In particular, by extending the game 
presented in Section 3, we analyze under what conditions joining GATT/WTO is a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our results. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 Preliminary 
To simplify, we assume that there are no import-competing firms in an importing, i.e., 
home, country. Only a firm in an exporting, i.e., foreign (*), country supplies a product such 
as crude oil, corn, wheat, and so on, to both the home and foreign markets. The foreign firm is 
assumed to be a monopoly. The inverse demand functions of both markets are given by: 
s
qaP −=  and ,** qaP −=                                          (1) 
where P )( *P  is the price, and q )( *q  is the quantity supplied in the home (foreign) 
market. Furthermore, s  represents the market size of the home country.  
The profit function of the foreign firm is expressed as: 
,
,)(
**
*****
qqX
XcqPqtP
+=
−+−=Π
                                        (2) 
where )0(≥t  is a per unit import tariff, and thus 0=t  means a free trade policy. 
Furthermore, )(* ac <  is the marginal cost of production and *X  is the production (or 
capacity) level. We assume that there are no international transfer costs. 
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The welfare of the home country is given by: 
.
2
1)( 2.
0
tqq
s
tqPqdzzPW
q
+=+−=                                    (3) 
Furthermore, the welfare of the foreign country is given by: 
.
2
1)( *
2****
0
**
*
Π+=Π+−=  qqPdzzPW q                            (4) 
 
2.2 The game structure 
To analyze the cases of precommitment and non-precommitment, we consider a 
three-stage game as follows. 
(i) In the case of precommitment, the foreign firm believes that the home government will 
charge the ex ante announced tariff rate after the firm decides the production level, and the 
home government then actually implements the tariff policy and does not renege on it. 
In the first stage, the home government sets an ex ante optimal tariff rate; in the second 
stage, the foreign firm decides the production level, given the tariff rate; in the final stage, the 
foreign firm decides to allocate the product to the home and foreign markets, given the tariff 
rate and the production level.  
The structure of the above game implies that the home government is a Stackelberg leader 
and the foreign firm is a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly, based on this structure, a free 
trade policy occurs when the home government precommits to zero tariffs in the first stage. 
(ii) In the case of non-precommitment, the foreign firm does not believe that the home 
government will set the ex ante announced tariff rate after the firm decides the production 
level, and thus the home government has to decide the ex post tariff rate only after the foreign 
firm decides the production level. 
In the first stage, the foreign firm decides the production level; in the second stage, given 
the production level, the home government sets an ex post optimal tariff rate; in the final stage, 
the foreign firm decides to allocate the product to the home and foreign markets, given the 
tariff rate and the production level. In this case, the foreign firm is a Stackelberg leader and 
the home government is a Stackelberg follower.  
Here we introduce the zero stage into the game, in which the home government announces 
the tariff rates schedule that presents the relationship between the tariff rate and the 
production level before the production decision. As will be shown below, the announced tariff 
rate schedule represents a reaction function of the tariff rate with respect to the production 
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level. Thus, in the first stage, the foreign firm decides the production level, given the 
announced tariff rate schedule, i.e., the reaction function of the home government; in the 
second stage, the home government actually charges the tariff rate, which is determined by the 
production level; in the final stage, the foreign firm decides to allocate the product to the 
home and foreign markets, given the tariff rate and the production level. 
For these cases, we derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) by backward 
induction. 
 
2.3 Trade decision in the final stage 
Let us derive the equilibrium of the trade decision in the final stage, in which, given the 
production level, ,0* >X  and the tariff rate, ,0≥t  the foreign firm decides to distribute the 
product between both the home and foreign markets according to: 
.02)1(2)()( **
*
*
*
=−+
+
−=−
∂
∂
+−
∂
∂
+−=
∂
Π∂ tXq
s
sqX
q
PPq
q
PtP
q
       (5) 
Thus, we derive the quantities in both markets in the final stage as follows: 
t
s
sX
s
stXq
)1(21
),( **
+
−
+
=  and ,
)1(21
1),( *** t
s
sX
s
tXq
+
+
+
=          (6) 
where ,02 * ≥>≡ tXt  so that t  is the prohibitive tariff level. 
 
 
3. Tariff Policies and Production Decision 
 
   In this section, we address the equilibrium in the first and the second stages, i.e., in the 
stages involving the tariff rate and the production level decisions. First, in Section 3.1, we 
consider the precommitment case, in which the home government decides the ex ante optimal 
tariff in advance. We also consider a free trade policy, i.e., zero tariff rates. Second, in Section 
3.2, we analyze the non-precommitment case, in which the home government cannot 
precommit to the tariff policy before the foreign firm’s production decision. Thus, given the 
production level, the home government has to choose the ex post optimal tariff rate. In Section 
3.3, we compare the cases of the ex ante tariff policy, the ex post tariff policy, and the free 
trade policy, respectively. 
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3.1  The precommitment case: an ex ante optimal tariff and a free trade policy  
We begin by discussing the case of an ex ante optimal tariff policy. In particular, in the 
presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions, the foreign firm believes that 
the home government will execute the ex ante optimal tariff rate after the firm’s production 
decision. In other words, the home government will not revise the tariff rate. 
Taking (1), (2), and (6) into account, in the second stage, given the tariff rate, the 
first-order condition (FOC) to maximize the foreign firm’s profit with respect to the 
production level is given by:  
,0
11
2 **
=
+
−
+
−=
∂
Π∂ t
s
sX
s
A
X
                                      (7) 
where .0* >−= caA  Thus, the production level in the second stage is expressed as: 
.
22
1* tsAsX −+=                                                   (8) 
Eq. (8) is the reaction function of the foreign firm with respect to the tariff rate. Based on (6) 
and (8), the supplies to the home and foreign markets are respectively given by: 
)(
2
)( tAstq pc −=  and ,
2
1* Aq
pc
=                                    (9) 
where superscript pc stands for the ex ante optimal tariff policy in the precommitment case. 
   In view of (1), (3), (8), and (9), the home country’s welfare function is expressed as: 
).()}({
2
1)( 2 ttqtq
s
tW pcpcpc +=                                      (10)             
Given (10), the FOC to maximize the home country’s welfare is given by: 
.0
2
)(
)()()()(1)(
=
−
=
∂
∂
++
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
sttq
t
tqttq
t
tqtq
st
tW
pc
pc
pc
pc
pc
pc
                        (11)             
Therefore, we have the ex ante optimal tariff rate as follows: 
.
3
At pc =                                                         (12) 
For the following analysis, substituting (12) into (8), we have the production level in the 
precommitment case as follows: 
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.
6
32* AsX pc +=                                                   (13) 
We understand that point pc in Fig. 1 and 2, { },, * pcpc Xt  is a Stackelberg equilibrium in 
which the home government is a leader and the foreign firm is a follower. Based on (3), (4), 
(9), and (12), the welfare of the home and foreign countries are: 
2
6
AsW pc =  and .
72
278 2* AsW pc +=                                 (14)             
Now we proceed to the case of a free trade policy. Suppose that the home government 
precommits to zero tariffs, i.e., .0=t  Hence, from (8), the production level is given by: 
,
2
1 ** pcf XAsX >+=                                              (15) 
where superscript f indicates a free trade policy (see point f in Fig. 1 and 2). Accordingly, in 
view of (9), the supplies to the home and foreign markets are given by: 
Asq f
2
=  and .
2
1 *.* pcf qAq ==                                    (16) 
We thus obtain the welfare of both countries under a free trade policy as follows: 
2
8
AsW f =  and .
8
32 2* AsW f +=                                    (17) 
Taking (14) and (17) into account, let us compare the welfare of both countries in the case 
of the ex ante optimal tariff and the free trade policies. We obtain easily fpc WW >  and 
.**
fpc
WW <  As already shown in Brander and Spencer (1984, Proposition 1), the ex ante 
optimal tariff policy is superior to the free trade policy for the home country. That is, the tariff 
policy reduces imports, and thus reduces consumer surplus, whereas it increases tariff 
revenues by snatching the rent of the foreign firm’s (i.e., the monopolist’s) profits. The latter 
positive effect outweighs the former negative effect, so that the ex ante optimal tariff policy 
improves the home country’s welfare, compared with the free trade policy case. However, 
from the viewpoint of world welfare composed of both the importing and exporting countries, 
the ex ante optimal tariff policy is inferior to the free trade policy, because it holds that 
.
8
)1(3
72
2720 *22* ffpcpc WWAsAsWW +=+<+=+  
 
3.2  The non-precommitment case: a time-consistent tariff policy 
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We assume that the home government cannot precommit to the tariff policy before the 
production decision by the foreign firm. In other words, as addressed below, the foreign firm 
expects that the home government has an incentive to renege on the ex ante announced tariff 
rate after the production decision. In a sense, there exists a time-inconsistency problem with 
respect to the tariff policy. 
The foreign firm does not believe the ex ante tariff rate announced by the home 
government, because the tariff policy is not credible. Accordingly, in the second stage, given 
,0* >X  and in view of (3) and (6), the home government has to choose the tariff rate to 
maximize the welfare function as follows: 
).,()},({
2
1),( *2** tXtqtXq
s
tXW +=                                  (18)             
Given (18), the FOC is given by: 
.0
)1(2
),()12(
),(),(),(),(1)(
*
*
*
*
*
=
+
−+
=
∂
∂
++
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
s
sttXqs
t
tXqttXq
t
tXqtXq
st
tW
                     (19)             
Thus, the tariff rate depends on the production level as follows: 
.
34
)12(2 *X
s
st
+
+
=                                                   (20) 
Eq. (20) denotes the reaction function (or the optimal tariff rate schedule) of the home 
government with respect to the production level. Thus, the foreign firm has an incentive to 
decrease the production level to reduce the tariff rate. Furthermore, eq. (20) implies that the 
home government does not have any incentive to revise the tariff rate decided by the 
production level, so that the tariff policy is time consistent.  
Taking (6) and (20), we derive the following: 
**
34
2)( X
s
sXqtc
+
=  and ,
34
32)( *** X
s
sXq tc
+
+
=                        (21) 
where superscript tc indicates a time-consistent tariff policy in the non-precommitment case. 
In the first stage, based on (1), (2), (20), and (21), the foreign firm decides the production 
level to maximize the profit: .
)34(
92012)( *2
2
***






+
++
−=Π X
s
ssAXXtc  That is, from the 
FOC, we obtain the production level as follows: 
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.
)92012(2
)34( *
2
2
* pctc XA
ss
sX <
++
+
=                                   (22) 
In view of (22), to avoid a heavy tariff, the foreign firm will reduce its production level. 
Thus, substituting (22) into (20), the time-consistent tariff, which is ex post optimal, is: 
.
92012
)34)(12(
2 Ass
ssttc
++
++
=                                              (23) 
In view of (12) and (23), it holds that .pctc tt >  As pointed out by Lapan (1988), in 
which he analyzes the perfect competition case, we confirm that the ex post optimal tariff rate 
is higher than the ex ante optimal tariff rate in the case of an export monopoly. Furthermore, 
we understand that point tc in Fig. 1 and 2, { }tctc Xt *, , is a Stackelberg equilibrium, in which 
the home government is a follower and the foreign firm is a leader. 
Using (4), (18), (21), (22), and (23), the welfare of the home and foreign countries are: 
2
22
3
)92012(2
)34( A
ss
ssW tc
++
+
=  and .
)92012(8
)275228()34( 2
22
22
* A
ss
sssW tc
++
+++
=    (24) 
 
Fig. 1 & Fig. 2 
 
3.3 Comparison: a free trade and a time-consistent tariff policy 
Based on (14) and (24), although omitting some calculations, we obtain directly 
tcpc WW >  and .** tcpc WW >  Thus, we show that the welfare of the home and foreign 
countries under the ex ante optimal tariff policy is always larger than that under the ex post 
time-consistent optimal tariff policy. Taking (21), (22), and (23) into account, because the ex 
post tariff rate is larger than the ex post tariff rate, the amount of imports in the home country 
and the production level of the foreign firm are sufficiently smaller than those in the case of 
the ex ante optimal tariff policy. Furthermore, it holds that .** tctcpcpc WWWW +>+  The 
results are basically similar to those shown by Lapan (1988, Proposition 1). 
Let us now compare the welfare in the case of the ex post time-consistent tariff policy and 
in the case of the free trade policy. In view of (17) and (24), with regard to the welfare of the 
home country, we derive the following relationship: 
,)(ˆ)( ssWW ftc <≥⇔<≥                                          (25) 
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where .564.0ˆ ≈s  In view of (25), we derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1  
If the market size of an importing country is larger (smaller) than a certain level, i.e., 
,ˆ)( ss <>  the importing country prefers a free trade (an ex post time-consistent tariff) policy.  
 
Horiba and Tsutsui (2000, Proposition 5, Corollary 2) shows that free trade dominates the 
tariff policy in terms of welfare ranking, if the adjustment costs of the duopolistic firms are 
sufficiently large. Although their result is closely related to ours, the point of our result is the 
degree of market size of an importing country, not the adjustment costs of the firms. 
To consider the effect of market size on the production level, taking (15) and (22) into 
account, the difference in production levels between the cases of free trade and the tariff 
policy is: 
.
)92012(2
)51612(
2
2
*** A
ss
sssXXX tcf
++
++
=−≡Δ                              (26) 
Given (26), we derive .0)(
*
>
Δ
ds
Xd  The difference increases with an increase in the 
market size of the importing country. In other words, if the market size is small, the difference 
is not large. For example, consider a non-oil-producing developing country. Even if the 
developing country charges a tariff on the export monopoly, such as OPEC, the effect on the 
production level is not significant. Although the amount of imports certainly decreases, and 
thus consumer surplus falls, compared with the free trade case, the developing country can 
take rents from the profits of the export monopoly as tariff revenues. Hence, because the latter 
positive effect outweighs the former negative effect, the developing country prefers the tariff 
policy.  
Let us assume that the market size of the home country is smaller. See points f and tc in 
Fig. 1. In this case, the negative slope of the reaction function of the production level with 
respect to the tariff rate is not steep, and therefore the degree of the decrease in the production 
level in response to an increase in the tariff rate is small. On the other hand, the positive slope 
of the reaction function of the tariff rate with respect to the production level is also not steep, 
and therefore the decrease in the tariff rate in response to a decrease in the production level is 
small. Thus, even if the small home country charges a tariff, the decrease in the amount of 
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imports is not large, compared with the free trade case. Instead, to extract rents from the 
foreign export monopoly, the small home country will use the tariff policy. Thus, it holds that 
.ftc WW >  
In contrast, in the case of a non-oil-producing developed country with a larger market, the 
effect of a decrease in consumer surplus outweighs that of rent snatching, so that the 
developed country prefers a free trade policy. See points f and tc in Fig. 2. In this case, in 
contrast to the case of a small market size, the decrease in the production level in response to 
an increase in the tariff rate, and the decrease in the tariff rate in response to a decrease in the 
production level are large. If a large home country charges a tariff rate, the magnitude of the 
associated decrease in imports is large. This leads to a huge reduction of consumer surplus in 
the home country. Hence, because it holds that ,tcf WW >  the large home country prefers a 
free trade policy.  
   Furthermore, avoiding the tedious calculations, we obtain .*** fpctc WWW <<  Thus, 
the foreign country always prefers free trade to the tariff policy. 
Finally, with respect to the total welfare of the world economy, composed of both the 
importing and exporting countries, we have: 
.
8
)1(3
)92012(8
)276444()34( 22
22
22
ftc WAsA
ss
sssW

=
+
<
++
+++
=                 (27) 
where .,,* tcfjWWW jjj =+≡

 It is shown clearly in (27) that free trade is superior to the 
ex post time-consistent tariff policy for the world economy. 
In the case of a small home country, the home government chooses an ex post 
time-consistent tariff policy. Thus, the tariff policy reduces the welfare of the exporting 
country and the world economy. However, based on (27), we obtain the effect of an increase 
in market size on the magnitude of the difference in the welfare between free trade and the 
tariff policy as follows: 
).0(
)92012(8
)276444()34()92012)(1(3 2
22
2222
>
++
+++−+++
=−≡Δ A
ss
ssssssWWW tcf

 
Because we have ,0)( >Δ
ds
Wd

 if the market size is small, then the welfare gap between 
free trade and the tariff policy is not large. This is also true for the effect of an increase in the 
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market size on the welfare gap with respect to the foreign country, i.e., ,0)(
*
>
Δ
ds
Wd  where 
).0(*** >−≡Δ tcf WWW  This result implies that the welfare loss under the tariff policy is 
not very significant unless the market size is large.  
If the market size is larger than a certain level, i.e., ,sˆs >  then the home government 
prefers a free trade policy that is also preferable for the foreign country. However, can a free 
trade policy be credible? In the next section, we discuss this issue. 
 
 
4. The Role of GATT/WTO as Commitment Devices 
 
4.1 Is a free trade policy credible? 
   As mentioned above, a free trade policy is the specific case, in which the home 
government can precommit in advance to zero tariffs. Based on (8) and (9), we have 
)0(** == tXX pcf  and ).0( == tqq pcf  In addition, taking (11) into account, we derive 
.0
2
)0()(
0
>
=
=
∂
∂
=
tq
t
tW pc
t
pc
 Thus, it holds that ).()0( pcpcpcf ttWtWW =<==  
However, a free trade policy in itself is not credible because the home government has an 
incentive to renege on zero tariffs after the production level decision by the foreign firm. 
Suppose that the foreign firm decides the production level under free trade, i.e., zero tariffs, in 
the first stage because it expects a free trade policy will be implemented by the home 
government. In the second stage, the home government changes the tariff rate from zero to 
some positive value that maximizes welfare, given the production level in the case of free 
trade. Hence, we have ),0,()0,( ** ==>>= tXWWtXWW fffR  where RW  stands for 
the welfare of the home country when it reneges on the tariff rate. Therefore, a free trade 
policy is not credible for the foreign firm. See point f and R in Fig. 1 and 2.  
Similarly, for the case of an ex ante optimal tariff policy without any commitment devices, 
it holds that ).,(),( **' pcpcpcpcpcR ttXWWttXWW ==>>=  See points f and R’ in Fig. 
1 and 2. In other words, only a time-consistent tariff policy is credible for the foreign firm. 
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4.2 Free trade and GATT/WTO as commitment devices 
As shown in previous sections, the time-consistent tariff policy is rational for an importing 
country with a small market, such as developing countries. However, cannot a home country 
with a large market, for example developed countries such as Japan and the US, enforce a free 
trade policy? In this case, it holds that tcpcf *** Π>Π>Π  and ,*** tcpcf WWW >>  so 
that both the foreign firm and foreign government prefer free trade. Thus, the home 
government expects that a free trade policy can be made credible by becoming a member of 
GATT/WTO as a commitment device. That is, the home government has to be punished if it 
deviates from the rules of GATT/WTO. In turn, by observing that the home country is a 
member of GATT/WTO, the foreign firm and the foreign government anticipate that the free 
trade policy is credible. Therefore, if the home government joins GATT/WTO, the home and 
foreign countries Pareto improve from the suboptimal time-consistent tariff policy 
equilibrium. 
Applying the three-stage game presented in the previous section, we develop the game as 
follows (see Fig. 3). In the zero stage, the home government decides whether to join 
GATT/WTO or not. If it chooses to become the member, the home government can 
precommit to a free trade policy, i.e., zero tariffs, consistent with the rules of GATT/WTO. 
This means that the foreign firm believes that the free trade policy of the home government is 
credible. Otherwise, the game proceeds to the first stage. In this stage, whether the home 
government decides to make the first move or not depends on the foreign firm’s expectation 
of the tariff policy. That is, we assume that p  is the subjective probability as believed by the 
foreign firm that the home government will move first (or become a Stackelberg leader). That 
is, the foreign firm expects that the home government will actually implement the ex ante 
announced tariff rate after the firm’s production decision; however, the tariff policy is not 
necessarily credible. In this case, however, because it holds that tcpc WW >  and 
,** tcpc Π>Π  if the foreign firm believes it, then the home government itself prefers the ex 
ante tariff rate to the ex post tariff rate. However, the ex ante tariff policy is not a credible 
commitment. Thus, in this stage, the home government decides to make the first move or not 
with a certain probability. We also assume that this proportion is common knowledge. Finally, 
in the second stage, as examined in the previous section, if the home government is a leader, 
the Stackelberg equilibrium in the case of precommitment tariff policy holds, i.e., point pc in 
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Fig. 1 and 2. Otherwise, the Stackelberg equilibrium in the case of non-precommitment tariff 
policy holds, i.e., point tc in Fig. 1 and 2. By backward induction, we derive an SPNE. 
 
Fig. 3 
 
We obtain directly that becoming a member of GATT/WTO is chosen as an SPNE of the 
extended game if and only if it holds that  
.)1( tcpcf WppWW −+≥                                           (28) 
Eq. (28) implies the incentive compatibility constraint in which the home government 
joins GATT/WTO. Eq. (28) can be rewritten as: 
.1 p
WW
WW
tcpc
tcf
≥
−
−
>                                                (29)  
That is, to ensure that becoming a member of GATT/WTO is an SPNE, the subjective 
probability as believed by the foreign firm should be less than a certain value. 
Based on (14), (17), and (24), eq. (29) can be rewritten as follows. 
,
)(
3
1
)(
4
1
)( p
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s
s ≥
Ω−
Ω−
≡ω                                               (30) 
where 
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2 92012
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
++
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=Ω
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ss  and .0)( <Ω′ s  Note that 0)( >′ sω  and ,
4
3)(
8
5
<≤ sω  
for .0≥>∞ s   
Before discussing the conditions for which becoming a member of GATT/WTO is an 
SPNE, we consider the case of an importing country with a smaller market size, i.e., .ˆss <  
Suppose .)ˆ( ps >ω  Hence, there exists { }.)( psss =≡′ ω  Therefore, based on eq. (30), for 
,ˆ sss ′>>  the importing country chooses to become the member to maintain free trade. 
However, in view of Proposition 1, the importing country prefers the time-consistent tariff 
policy to free trade. In other words, we omit the case of the importing country with a smaller 
market size, i.e., ,sˆs <  to analyze the conditions of an SPNE. Furthermore, an SPNE does 
not exist if it holds that ).(
4
3 sp ω>≥  
Now we consider the case of the importing country with a relatively large market size, 
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.sˆs >  Using Proposition 1 and eq. (30), the conditions to ensure that becoming a member of 
GATT/WTO is an SPNE are: 
(i) for ,sˆs >  if ,)ˆ( ps >ω  or                                            (31) 
(ii) for ),ˆ(~ sss >>  where { },)(~ psss =≡ ω  if ).(
4
3 sp ω>>                   (32) 
Condition (i) states that if the subjective probability as believed by the foreign firm is 
small, in other words, if the foreign firm expects that the home government might not make 
the first move, then the importing home country with the relatively larger market size, ,sˆs >  
decides to become a member of GATT/WTO. Similarly, condition (ii) states that if the 
subjective probability as believed by the foreign firm falls within a certain range, the 
importing home country with a large market size, ),ˆ(~ sss >>  decides to become a member 
of GATT/WTO. In this case, the foreign firm expects that the home government might make 
the leader, and thus ex post renege on the tariff policy. Thus, for joining GATT /WTO to be an 
SPNE, the market size of the importing county must be sufficiently large. 
We summarize the above discussions as the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 
With respect to the market size of an importing country, if either (31) or (32) hold, the 
importing country decides to join a member of GATT/WTO as a commitment device. In this 
case, the importing country can commit credibly to a free trade policy under which both the 
importing and exporting countries achieve a Pareto improvement. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
   In view of the discussion in Section 4.1, we can interpret the subjective probability or the 
belief as the degree to which the foreign firm expects that the home government would ex 
post renege on the ex ante announced tariff rate charged in the precommitment case. Hence, 
eq. (29) or eq. (30) is rewritten as follows: 
.)()(1 ' pWW
WWss tcR
tcf
≥
−
−
≡>> ψω                                     (33) 
That is, with respect to the conditions that ensure an SPNE, eq. (33) states that the 
subjective probability must be sufficiently small and/or the market size of an importing 
country must be sufficiently large, compared with the case shown in Proposition 2. However, 
 18
even in that case, our main results cannot be revised qualitatively. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Lapan (1988) analyzes a time-consistent tariff policy in the presence of a time lag between 
production and consumption decisions in the case of perfect competition, based on a general 
equilibrium model. He illustrates that the welfare of both importing and exporting countries in 
the case of a time-consistent tariff policy is lower than in the case of an ex ante optimal tariff 
policy. 
Assuming an export monopoly, we considered explicitly the strategic relationship between 
an importing (home) government and an exporting (foreign) firm in a game theoretic 
framework, based on a very simple partial equilibrium model. In this case, ex ante (post) 
optimal tariff policy is interpreted as a Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the home 
government is a leader (follower) and the foreign firm is a follower (leader, respectively).  
Furthermore, we showed that the reaction functions of the home government and the 
foreign firm depend on the market size of the home country. In addition, we showed that, 
compared with the free trade case, whether the welfare of the home country decreases or not 
depends on the market size. In particular, if the market size is larger (smaller) than a certain 
level, the welfare in the case of a free trade policy is higher (lower) than that in the case of a 
time-consistent tariff policy. Thus, the home country with a larger market prefers free trade, 
and needless to say, so does the foreign firm. 
However, a free trade policy is not credible and is time-inconsistent. In this case, we 
interpreted the GATT/WTO rules as commitment devices. Staiger and Tabellini (1989, 1991, 
and 1999) examine empirically whether GATT/WTO rules can help governments make 
commitments to superior trade policies that would not be credible to domestic agents in the 
absence of such rules. Following their approach, using a game theoretic framework, we 
showed that the condition under which becoming a member of GATT/WTO is a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium depends on the subjective probability as believed by the foreign firm 
and on the market size of the importing country. Based on this result, we suggest that a 
country with a large market such as the US, Japan, or any other developed countries, maybe 
including China, should join the GATT/WTO regime to make trade partners believe that they 
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have committed to free trade, and, as a result, the significant benefits of free trade accrue to 
the world economy. 
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Fig.1 Equilibrium in the case of ss >ˆ  
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Fig.2 Equilibrium in the case of ss <ˆ  
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Home: The home government 
Foreign: The foreign firm 
Fig. 3 The structure of the game 
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